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Gold was discovered on the Palmer River in the far north of 
Queensland in 1872, by WiUiam Hann, but it was not until payable 
quantities were found by James Venture Mulligan in the following 
year, did a rush follow. This remote river in Cape York Peninsula 
yielded over a million ounces of extremely fine, rich alluvial gold, 
most of it during the first heady years to 1876, its value maintaining 
a high value of £4 or more per ounce. The early reports sparked off 
a tremendous population movement into an area not previously settl-
ed by Europeans, with rush fever masking any doubts. 
In three years from 1874 to 1877 the population of Palmer surged 
from 2,000 to 19,500. Enormous as this rise for the population was, 
it was overwhelmed by fact that by 1877 over 90 percent of the 
population was Chinese. 
The Chinese influx occurred in two phases. Early in the rush, there 
was a steady arrival of Chinese from other parts of Australia, many 
of them old hands from northern gold fields, who by the end of 1874 
numbered 1,500, almost 40% of the field's population.' Suddenly 
in 1875, a damburst of immigrants direct from China arrived, with 
the Chinese population on the Palmer swelling to 9,000 during July 
1875. Early in 1876, Warden Philip Sellheim was advised that the 
Hopkee (Coalition) Company was planning to run a monthly ser-
vice between Cooktown and Hong Kong. The first Hopkee vessel 
steamed into Cooktown on March 14 just as news of the discovery 
of payable gold on the Hodgkinson was filtering through.^ The 
Hodgkinson rush caused the Palmer to be largely abandoned by 
Europeans. A little over a year later there were approximately 18,000 
Chinese on the Palmer,' thereby overwhelming in number the Euro-
pean miners and gold field administration. 
While the Chinese were familiar and contentious figures on many 
Australian mining fields, never before had they achieved such com-
Noreen Kirkman is both librarian and historian with particular experience 
in North Queensland history, especially the Palmer. 
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plete or sudden dominance, and their presence not only impinged 
on the conduct of affairs on the Palmer, but also on colonial policy-
making in both Brisbane and London. Their influx was one of the 
most dramatic episodes in the history of immigration on the 
Australian continent, although the evidence stemming from it is 
slight, comprising only two first-hand accounts by participants, and 
a farrago of unsympathetic statements by Europeans. Even at the 
time, their impact on both Queensland legislation and folklore was 
recognized. As J. M. Macrossan told the Legislative Assembly: 
"There would never have been a Chinese question in Queensland 
had it not been for the discovery of the Palmer River Goldfield"." 
The majority of Chinese were from south Kwangtung province, 
speaking either Sze-Yap or Sam-Yap dialects. Most were from 
agricultural communities: farmers, gardeners, labourers, butchers, 
and a few scholars. Impoverished farmers, such as Taam Sze Pui, 
were easily tempted by emigration agents who described the Palmer 
as a place where gold was "inexhaustible and free to all". ' 
Queensland after 1873 offered an added incentive insofar as there 
was no longer an export duty on gold. The Chinese came mostly 
in kinship groups; only a few came individually, or as contract 
labourers. They relied on kin for mutual aid which at a more for-
mal level mutual aid took the form of either social guilds or volun-
tary groups which extracted a levy for benevolent purposes. The ob-
jectives of one guild operating in Cooktown in 1875, included: 
1. to secure passages to and from the gold fields; 
2. to build clubhouses; 
3. to pay the passages of members to China, when unable to work 
through sickness or accident; 
4. to bury the dead; 
5. to purchase mining property; and 
6. to pay the expenses of lawsuits.^ 
In groups and generally in single file, the new-chum Chinese miners 
made the journey to the Palmer on foot, their equipment and pro-
visions strung on poles or shovels across their shoulders. 
Taam Sze Pui's first trip to the Palmer was very long and har-
rowing. The party was in constant fear of an attack by Aborigines, 
to quote Taam's memoirs: "The fear of such a fate kept one and 
all together and no one dare tarry behind to rest or to regain his 
breath". Experiencing almost unbearable heat, they eventually ar-
rived on the field exhausted and completely out of provisions. Lack-
ing also the necessary knowledge to carry out mining, Taam Sze Pui's 
party had to turn to a more experienced compatriot, Kwok Lung, 
who instructed them how to make a living. Indeed, Taam gave several 
instances where kinship support was forthcoming. When illness beset 
the party, one Chan Poon came to their aid. Then when the cost 
52 
of treating Taam's father exceeded their savings, a relative mortgaged 
the family house and remitted the amount (£32) through Man 
Chuen's pearl shop in Canton, which was passed onto Man Chuen 
On in Cooktown to be collected.' 
THE CHINESE MINING COMMUNITY 
The Chinese miners worked with determination and intelligence. 
Because systematic working of large areas, and communal pooling 
of earnings, served to insulate the Chinese from the notoriously ir-
regular returns, which made alluvial mining so unpredictable a 
livelihood for individual European miners, a large group of Chinese 
diggers working co-operatively and living frugally could be assured 
of a long period of production in almost any part of Palmer. It also 
afforded them the luxury of more leisurely prospecting, which in 
turn often led to rewarding finds. Their methods, described as the 
"safest and surest",* were characterised by co-operation, 
thoroughness and physical mobility. Individual Chinese could work 
towards securing "a fair share", permitting them "to resist more 
strongly a run of ill-luck than the Europeans". ' When beset by a 
bad return, the poorer miners would then rely on "the most for-
tunate of their countrymen for support", with subscriptions 
sometimes being collected and relief kitchens being set up.'" Of min-
ing methods, co-operative cradling was preferred, with two digging, 
two carrying washdirt, and the remainder bagging gold. At night, 
blowing and weighing would conclude the daily routine." The whole 
area of the claim was scoured, and reworked three to four times, 
unless a more profitable find was located. European observers 
dismissed the success of this patient and logical approach as "luck". 
One newspaper correspondent noted: 
The Chinese are everywhere ... and as by their system of work, 
they take everything "on the face", instead of only working the 
most likely spots, as is the case of Europeans, their perseverance 
is naturally rewarded — in an essentially patchy diggings — with 
an occasional lucky find. There is an impression on the field that 
at least three fourths of the gold falls to the lot of Chinamen.'^ 
However, these systematic methods only served to intensify the 
resentment among European miners of the Chinese presence on the 
field. 
* * * 
There were several early attempts in mid-1874 to "excite the miners 
to violent resistance" against the Chinese working the Left Hand 
Branch and beaches downstream from German Bar to Palmerville. 
However Howard St George reported that "the miners have taken 
no notice of the illegal councils of these men, and the goldfield con-
tinues in its usual peaceable state . . . " . " When the rush to the Nor-
manby River petered out about March 1875, Europeans returned 
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to Sandy Creek, and again tried to jostle the Chinese out. A sign 
was nailed to a tree at Sandy Creek, with the warning: "Any 
Chinaman found higher up this creek will be instantly seized and 
hanged until he is dead.'"" Sellheim reported two "collisions" bet-
ween two different parties, but commented at the time that he did 
not expect any further trouble as long as he was "successful in keep-
ing the two interests separate."" Nevertheless, he sensed a dangerous 
level of antagonism on the part of European miners by mid 1875: 
... the very strong feeling that exists here against the Chinese, and 
the intensity of which is increasing daily at the same rate as this 
class of population is flocking-in. I am only too sensible to the 
fact, that any day some trifling event may fan the smouldering fire 
into a blaze, and in such a case the want of an experienced officer 
in charge of Police would be felt very much." 
By mid-March 1876, most of the Palmer proper was in the hands 
of Chinese: the primary concentration of European miners had mov-
ed to the vicinity of Fine Gold Creek and the Little Mitchell River. 
Reviewing the situation on the Palmer Sellheim suggested that a new 
gold field be estabished in order to supervise the European popula-
tion, now distant from Maytown: 
The portion nearest to Edwtown is very nearly worked out, as far 
as Europeans are concerned, and before long will be entirely in 
the hands of the Chinese. The white population is dally drawing 
out farther towards Mitchell Waters, and when you consider it may 
be necessary to divide the present P.R.G. into separate Fields, I 
would have the liberty to point out to you that Fine Gold Creek, 
or the Little Mitchell will be more convenient as a central position 
for the camp of the Warden of the new G.F.'^ 
A new gold field was eventually established, not on Fine Gold Creek, 
but on the Hodgkinson, to which almost all of the European alluvial 
miners had moved within the month. 
GOVERNMENT DEALINGS WITH THE CHINESE 
By far the most pressing problem facing the gold field administra-
tion was the collection of payments for miners' rights. Sellheim came 
under a great deal of pressure from Under Secretary Lukin to "use 
every exertion" to keep revenue collection in proportion to the in-
coming Chinese population, 8,000 by May 1876. In conveying this 
instruction to an Assistant Warden, Sellheim patiently explained: 
I have therefore to ask you to be good enough to use all time that 
can possibly be spared from other duties, in looking up the Chinese, 
and particularly in the more distant camps from Oakey Creek." 
A year later, when the Chinese numbered between 16,000 and 17,OCX), 
Lukin was still urging that even more time be spent collecting 
revenue, adding that this was to be done "without undue violence"." 
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It was up to the individual warden how he interpreted this 
instruction. 
The gold field staff found it difficult to keep pace with the rapid 
increase in the Chinese population, especially the years 1876-1877. 
Some of the newcomers evaded payment of miners' rights, but in 
this respect, Sellheim opined, the Chinese "don't differ vastly from 
the Europeans."^" Admittedly, the language barrier was a problem, 
although translations of the Gold Fields Act were displayed 
periodically.^' More serious, however, was the existence of a bla-
tant breach in the issue of miners' rights to Chinese which remained 
undetected for several months and no doubt contributed to Chinese 
resistance to and distrust of the revenue collection system. At the 
height of the Chinese immigration, Sellheim was appalled to discover 
that Assistant Warden W. R. O. Hill had issued mere sUps of paper 
to Chinese instead of prescribed forms for miners' rights, and strong-
ly reprijpanded the Assistant Warden for the carelessness of his ac-
tion. The gross irregularity of this practice led to serious confronta-
tions between other gold field staff and Chinese, the latter believing 
they were legally licensed. 
Faced with official pressure to improve revenue collection, some 
wardens began to rely more and more on Aboriginal trackers to col-
lect revenue from Chinese. W. R. O. Hill admitted to using his 
trackers to "run them down", in addition to recruiting Native Police 
to join the field party.^^ Former Sub-Inspector Alexander Douglas 
Douglas was later to confirm that his detachment was used to "draft" 
out Chinese. How widespread this use of terror tactics is unknown, 
however neither Hill nor Douglas was condemned for their actions, 
although Native Police were not sanctioned to carry out gold field 
duty. When agents for Sun Yee Lee complained to the Colonial 
Secretary that Chinese had been assaulted by Native Troopers col-
lecting revenue, the matter was dismissed on the grounds that "no 
native police [were] employed under the Gold Fields Wardens in col-
lecting fees or in any other way."" 
More conspicuous in his treatment of Chinese was Thomas 
Coward. He carried out Lukin's instruction to an extreme degree, 
and was "universally hated by the Chinese".'" His conduct became 
so oppressive that it was eventually the subject of two government 
inquiries, in early 1876 and late 1877." In the first inquiry, specific 
cases of assault, unlawful imprisonment, excessive fining, and ob-
vious neglect of Chinese under Coward's supervision were cited. 
However, it was Coward's ill-treatment of Europeans which 
assisted in bringing about a second inquiry, the following year. Euro-
pean businessmen complained to the inquiry that "the Chinamen 
take their custom to other places, or, in fact, shift to other portions 
of the goldfield". This time Coward was found unsuitable for the 
post of Warden, and dismissed. 
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The decision was by no means unanimous, for Thomas Mcllwraith 
was later to praise Coward as "the only Warden who did his duty 
in collecting revenue from the Chinese."" 
The removal of Coward nonetheless highlights a measure of sup-
port from some sections of the European community for Chinese 
businessmen, no doubt due to the commercial interests they 
represented. Because of their wealth, Europeans tended to confer 
upon them a greater degree of respect and status than they did on 
the Chinese miner. Quong Nam Chong, the owner of one of the 
largest businesses on the Palmer, is a case in point, for he amassed 
an average of £400-500 a week." Tam Sie, who arrived on the field 
in 1875, had £15,000 in cash and £500 in assets by the dme he left 
the Palmer four years later." Chinese had early maximised their 
financial security with a monopoly over coin; they even set up their 
own bank." When European banks were later established, the 
Chinese divided their custom between the two main branches, the 
storekeepers preferring the Queensland Nadonal and the butchers 
the Bank of New South Wales. The Q.N. considered its Chinese 
customers "perfectly safe" and up to 1882, readily gave advances 
to them.'" The value of these customers was evident in the suspen-
sion of an acting manager for indiscreetly inducing a Chinese 
storekeeper to remove his account." 
THE ANTI-CHINESE AGITATION 
Nevertheless, while only rarely did animosity against the Chinese 
find expression in violence, it was to become a powerful political 
force. The anti-Chinese debate was ha^ed prima facie on the familiar 
stereotypes of the Victorian gold fields. It was claimed that Chinese 
miners did not prospect, but merely took advantage of the absence 
of European miners from their diggings, and that by their imper-
manency and stolid self-sufficiency they impeded European industry 
in reefing. Worst of all, the Chinese were vihfied as morally debas-
ed and carriers of disease, with a propensity for violent crime.'' 
However there were other businessmen who welcomed a stable laissez 
faire relationship with the Chinese, dreaming of Cooktown as an 
entrepot for Chinese and Indian trade, with its agricultural hinterland 
tilled by cheap Asian labour. Drawing their members from the 
Chamber of Commerce, the group's most outspoken and influen-
tial voice was the editor of the Cooktown Herald, W. H. L. Bailey, 
who claimed that his newspaper was "an advocate for Chinese labor 
uirected into a proper channel"." The pro-Chinese group defended 
the charges that the Chinese were undesirable immigrants, but did 
not oppose measures to restrict them from new gold fields. Yet when 
measures aimed at the Chinese threatened commercial interests by 
causing poverty among Chinese consumers, they were swiftly 
denounced. 
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The anti-Chinese agitation placed the government of Arthur 
Macalister in a quandary. Not only had the former Palmer ministry 
entered into negotiations to employ Chinese coolies on sugar plan-
tations, but the Governor, William Cairns, was totally opposed to 
any form of discriminatory legislation.'" Also, there existed inter-
national treaties between Great Britain and China which, in fact, 
discouraged any attempt to prohibit Chinese immigration. An in-
direct attempt to do so by strictly enforcing the health regulations 
with regard to Chinese immigrants, was considered unrealistic by 
Dr Conradi, the Health Officer at Cooktown, for all overseas 
steamers were already "subjected to the closest examinations"." In 
May 1876, the Macalister Ministry was defeated by George Thorn. 
William Murphy was sworn in as member for the new electorate of 
Cook. 
LEGISLATIVE DISCRIMINATION 
Under the guise of revenue raising, the Thorn administration mov-
ed quickly to amend existing legislation, placing further penalties 
on Chinese. Firstly, the duty on rice was increased from £2 to £7/6/8 
per ton under the Customs Duties Act, despite criticism that the ac-
tion was a "miserable contradiction" of the avowedly free-trade prin-
ciples of the government." 
A Chinese Oven, one of the items of heritage which the Palmer River Historic Preser-
vation Society is seeking to save. John Hay 
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Secondly, the government sought an amendment to the Gold Fields 
Act of 1874, proposing to raise miners' rights for "aliens" (African 
and Asiatic) to £3, six times the amount paid by European miners. 
Alien businessmen would also be affected under this amendment, 
with business licences rising from £4 to £10. In Parliament, the more 
blatant aspects of the Gold Fields Act amendment bill provoked stri-
dent debate, especially clause 3 which provided that any Chinese (or 
any other Asian or African for that matter) was automaticaUy an 
alien unless sufficient proof or naturalization was immediately 
forthcoming." 
As it eventuated. Governor Cairns gave assent to the Customs 
Duties Act of 1876, imposing a duty of one penny on each pound 
of imported rice, but deliberated over the amendment to the Gold 
Fields Act. Cairns informed the Earl of Carnarvon on 11 October 
that he had decided to reserve the bill on the grounds of its "ex-
traordinary nature".'* Within a month he received notice of his com-
mission to South Austraha; his replacement was Arthur Kennedy, 
Governor of Hong Kong. 
By this stage the prospects for alluvial miners on the Palmer were 
fast diminishing. A total of 7,708 Chinese arrived on the field within 
the first five months of 1877, bringing the population to around 
18,000 a number, in Sellheim's opinion, "considerably in excess of 
the capabilities of the field in the dry season."" By the close of May, 
the average earnings of the Chinese miners was estimated at a mere 
3 pennyweights. The increased rice tax was having its effect on the 
diet and health of the miners. Taam Sze Pui who arrived during this 
time was greatly disturbed by the distress of earlier arrivals: 
Oh, what a disappointment when we learnt that the rumour was 
unfounded and we were mislead! Not only was gold difficult to 
find the climate was not suitable and was the cause of frequent 
attacks of illness. As we went about, there met our gaze the im-
poverished condition and the starved looks of our fellow coun-
trymen who were either penniless or ill, and there reached our ears 
endless sighs of sorrow. Those who arriving for the first express-
ed no regret for being late, on the contrary, they were thinking 
of departing. Could we, who had just arrived, remain untouched 
at these sad tales?"" 
Disputes over claims, rare in the past, became more common, some 
leading to fighting. When the first of these occurred, Sellheim 
described it as "pecuhar", caused by the intrusion of "a mob of 
new chum Chinamen"."' Other disputes occurring throughout 1877 
were similarly triggered by new arrivals. 
Meanwhile the government had embarked upon yet another pro-
gramme to halt further immigration through quarantine regulations, 
which by its poor timing almost cost them the support of the new 
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governor, Arthur Kennedy. From January 1877, with the discovery 
of a case of smallpox, all vessels from Chinese ports had to obtain 
admission to pratique at the first port of call south of Somerset."' 
Kennedy, en route to Moreton Bay from Hong Kong, had intended 
disembarking at Cooktown but was prevented by the new regula-
tion. Waiting dignitaries were obliged to row out to the governor-
designate's quarantined steamer to present their petitions including 
a magnificently hand-painted scroll from a Chinese deputation."' 
With valuable cargoes remaining at sea for the quarantine period 
and shipping timetables disrupted, both European and Chinese com-
merce was severely affected. Little or no preparation was made to 
accommodate or feed the passengers of quarantined ships, and ship 
owners found themselves paying the costs. 
The clumsy and unpopular quarantine measures were, however, 
only a stopgap. What the government had in mind was two-fold at-
tack, involving not only an amendment to the Gold Fields Act to 
restrict Chinese mining, but also a measure to regulate immigration. 
The Chinese Immigrants Regulation BUI and the amendment to the 
Gold Fields Act progressed simultaneously through Parliament, and 
it is clear that most Parliamentarians did not distinguish between 
them in debate. The Chinese Immigrants Regulation Act, which 
became law on 20 August 1877, placed a £10 poll tax on Chinese 
entering the colony."" The Goldfields Act Amendment Act of 1877, 
passed 1 October, was essentially the same as the bill which had been 
reserved by Cairns; it imposed a £3 fee for miners' rights and £10 
for business licences. 
It was rumoured that the Chinese would physically resist any at-
tempt by the gold field administration to extract payment of £3 for 
a miners' right. Sellheim conveyed this undercurrent of discontent 
to the Under Secretary for Mines in 1877: 
I am informed by leading Chinamen that the passing of this Act 
is the cause of great discontent amongst their countrymen, and 
it is rumoured that at the expiration of many of the current licences, 
a rollup may be looked forward to, if the £3 licences should be 
strictly enforced. I trust such an event will not take place, as I fail 
to see how much bloodshed could be prevented in such a case."' 
However, no violence eventuated, as it became clear to gold fields 
staff that collection of revenue was now near to impossible. Indeed 
Sellheim asserted that "the issue of miners rights is a perfect dead 
letter","'' for it was evident to him that most of the Chinese miners 
were simply too impoverished to pay. Fines served no purpose, and 
if imprisonment was ordered, all "the gaols in the colony would be 
filled in a fortnight"."' Assistant Warden Farrelly, during his 
December patrol, let about one hundred Chinese miners go without 
payment, commenting that "the majority of the Chinese whose 
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Miners Rights have now expired are unable to pay for new ones."' 
From October 1877 to July 1878 only 217 miners' rights were col-
lected by Sellheim, in some months none at all."' By mid-1878, the 
manager of the Queensland National Bank reported a perceptible 
decline: 
... the old workings here are no longer payable and the imposi-
tion on them of the £3 for a miners right has driven away many 
who had that sum ... (As this amount) is required for the passage 
back, numbers of them who have little or nothing are most afraid 
to venture for fear of being "run in"."" 
Not only was trade between the port and the field disrupted, but 
a large concentration of Chinese paupers was being created. News 
that assent had been granted to the Goldfields Act Amendment Act 
1878 was hailed with much satisfaction on the Palmer from all 
quarters, both Chinese and European. 
The plight of the Chinese under the old legislation came to a head 
in 1878 in what have become known as the "Lukinville Riots". The 
Chinese Lukinville rush was the first substantial alluvial rush since 
the Hodgkinson. Its timing promised the remaining Chinese on the 
Palmer a release from the poverty that they had endured under the 
previous amendment to the Gold Fields Act. It was Lukinville which 
prompted a clamour for miners' rights during August 1878, which 
Sellheim claimed was the "largest issue that ever has taken place dur-
ing such a short period on any Australian Goldfield." With the in-
flux of 8,000 hopeful miners, including a small number of Euro-
peans, competition over limited resources was bound to occur. In-
formation was received that serious fighting had broken out among 
Chinese on or about 6 August, involving about 500-600 miners." 
This was the first of three disputes which became known as the 
Lukinville riots, possibly the most serious local affrays in Queensland 
history. The riots are still shrouded in mystery, as very little is known 
of the sequence of events, the numbers involved, or the issues from 
which the conflict arose. Certainly there were several days of violence, 
at least four deaths — other estimates vary from 9 to 48 deaths — 
and a number of other casualties occurred." The 6 August incident 
alarmed the gold field administration considerably, as violent 
disorder among the Chinese had been rare. Sellheim, having only 
just returned from the new rush, instructed Towner to proceed to 
Lukinville and arranged for additional police reinforcements from 
Byerstown.'" Fighting broke out again over a claim on 15 August. 
The police reported a "roll up amongst the Chinese ... There were 
800 Macao against 400 Canton men. Two men were killed and several 
wounded."" Sub-Inspector Britten later put the number of deaths 
at three. Four days later, another man was killed in a gambling 
house." 
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In reporting the four deaths, Sellheim identified the primary cause 
as inter-group rivalry. According to the Warden, the "Hong Kong" 
men had previously been in possession at the upper workings at the 
Byerstown-Uhrstown area, the "Tartars" at Jessop's Gully and the 
Conglomerate, with the "Macao" men at Stony and Sandy Creeks." 
On the evidence of some Chinese, Sellheim also blamed "gambhng 
vagabonds" for inciting riots to further their own interests. The sup-
posed ringleaders were charged with vagrancy and sentenced to 
Rockhampton Gaol; one of them was a prominent storekeeper and 
mine owner, Sam Hand, a naturahzed Chinese, married to an Irish 
woman, and resident in Australia for at least seventeen years. 
Sellheim's charge against Hand prompted a number of Chinese 
businessmen to forward a petition to the Governor requesting him 
to review the case. They attributed the main cause of the disturbance 
of 15 August to a breach in mining ethics on the part of the "Macao" 
men who had locked up valuable ground by force of arms to all 
newcomers, including those referred to as "Canton" men. When 
the latter attempted to occupy the disputed ground, fighting began. 
Hand, they submitted, was neither vagrant nor ringleader, it being 
"known to the Bench that he had a claim on Stoney Creek worth 
two hundred pounds and had on his person when arrested over twen-
ty pounds in money besides jewehry."" 
Mining disputes involving the locking up of ground or the jump-
ing of claims were certainly not unusual on gold fields. While district 
group rivalry cannot be discounted, for the Chinese themselves 
acknowledged its existence, the role of Sam Hand in the affair was 
most hkely accidental, although it is quite probable that, as a 
storekeeper, he was the creditor for one of the groups involved in 
the episode. 
Lukinville was the swansong of the Palmer's alluvial phase. By 
the end of 1883, the Chinese population had dropped to 1,043," a 
size approximating that of the first Chinese rush in mid-1874. 
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